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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






In re:  THOMAS SKINNER, 
                         Debtor 
 
WILLIAM SKINNER, 




THOMAS SKINNER; ANNA SKINNER  
_____________ 
       
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania                                                            
District Court No. 2-14-cv-06697 
District Judge: Honorable Michael M. Baylson 
_____________ 
                               
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
February 29, 2016 
 
Before: SMITH, HARDIMAN, and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed:  March 4, 2016)                              
_____________________ 
 
  OPINION 
_____________________        
                       
SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
 
 Thomas Skinner and his wife, Anna Skinner, allegedly misappropriated the funds 
of Dorothy Skinner, Thomas’ mother.1  They also placed her in Saint Joseph’s Manor, an 
                                                 
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
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assisted living facility, and proceeded to misappropriate the insurance funds that were 
intended to pay for Dorothy’s care.  As a result of her non-payment, Dorothy was evicted 
with an outstanding balance of $25,049.69, plus interest and fees.  Saint Joseph’s Manor 
filed a lawsuit in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County against Dorothy 
Skinner, Thomas Skinner, and William Skinner, the appellant in this case and Thomas’ 
brother.  Saint Joseph’s Manor seeks to recover Dorothy’s outstanding balance under a 
theory of unjust enrichment and the Pennsylvania Support Law, 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 
4601, et seq., which obligates the children of an indigent person to care for or financially 
assist that person.  The litigation against William and Dorothy is ongoing, and a default 
judgment was entered against Thomas in the amount of $32,225.56.   
 Thomas subsequently filed for protection under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy 
Code, and William filed a bankruptcy complaint claiming that Thomas has a 
non-dischargeable obligation to reimburse him for any liability that he may owe Saint 
Joseph’s Manor.  The Bankruptcy Court dismissed his complaint for lack of standing to 
challenge the dischargeability of Thomas’ debts, and the District Court affirmed.  This 
timely appeal follows.2 
                                                                                                                                                             
not constitute binding precedent. 
1 This case comes before us on an appeal granting a motion to dismiss the amended 
complaint.  Thus, we must assume that all of the facts alleged in the complaint are 
true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).   
 
2 We have appellate jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
The District Court had jurisdiction over the Bankruptcy Court’s dismissal order 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1) & 1334(a).  “Because the District Court sat 
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 On appeal, William argues that he has valid claims that are non-dischargeable 
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(4) & (a)(6).  He also argues that he has a valid claim 
under the Pennsylvania Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“UFTA”), 12 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. § 5101, et seq.   
 While section 523 provides that certain claims are non-dischargeable, William 
ignores the essential prerequisite that only a party to whom a claim is owed may seek to 
make its claim non-dischargeable under section 523.  Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 
218 (1998).  A “claim” under the Bankruptcy Code “is usually referring to a right to 
payment recognized under state law.”  Travelers Cas. & Surety Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas & 
Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 443, 451 (2007); see also 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (defining a claim as 
a “right to payment”).  Thus, only a party that has a valid claim under non-bankruptcy 
law has standing to challenge the dischargeability of that claim. 
 The only state law that William refers to on appeal in his discussion of subsections 
(a)(4) and (a)(6) is the Support Law, and he does so only in passing.  To the extent that 
William relies on the Support Law on appeal, this argument is waived, because he 
explicitly argued in the District Court that Thomas and Anna were liable to him “not 
under Pennsylvania Support Law . . . but for restitution.”  App. 46; see Gass v. Virgin 
Islands Tel. Corp., 311 F.3d 237, 246 (3d Cir. 2002).  Nonetheless, the District Court 
correctly concluded that the Pennsylvania Support Law does not provide the basis for 
                                                                                                                                                             
below as an appellate court, this Court conducts the same review of the Bankruptcy 
Court’s order as did the District Court.”  In re Telegroup, Inc., 281 F.3d 133, 136 
(3d Cir. 2002).  The relevant facts are undisputed, and because we are presented 
with a pure question of law, our review is de novo.  Id.     
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William’s claim against Thomas and Anna because there is no right of contribution or 
indemnification under the Support Law.  Instead, if a child “desire[s] to share his support-
burden, he [is] permitted to do so by joining those individuals in [the] case [against 
him],” and the court could then apportion liability amongst the various children.  Health 
Care & Ret. Corp. of Am. v. Pittas, 46 A.3d 719, 723 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012).  
 William also does not have a valid claim under the UFTA, which allows the 
creditor of a debtor to “avoid” any fraudulent transfers made by the debtor.  UFTA § 
5107(a).  For purposes of the UFTA claim, William concedes that Dorothy, his mother, is 
the debtor, and he claims that Thomas and Anna are the transferees.  While he argues that 
he is “[c]learly” a creditor of his mother because he has a claim against her under the 
UFTA and for unjust enrichment, we determine that it is clear that he is wrong.  The 
UFTA does not make one a creditor; instead it serves as a tool for creditors to recover 
fraudulent transfers.  Id; see also Kraisinger v. Kraisinger, 34 A.3d 168, 174-75 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2011).  Moreover, an unjust enrichment claim would require that Dorothy be 
“unjustly enriched at the expense of” William, which she was not.  Wilson Area Sch. 
Dist. v. Skepton, 895 A.2d 1250, 1254 (Pa. 2006).  Because William is not a creditor of 
Dorothy, the UFTA does not give him a valid claim.  UFTA § 5107(a).  Thus, because 
William does not have a valid claim against Thomas, he lacks standing to challenge the 
dischargeability of Thomas’ debts. 
 Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
 
 
